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TAXATION
JosEPH CuRTis*

Tax cases and legislation produced several changes in the law of some
importance and general interest. There was the usual multitude of clarifying
and minor substantive changes in the tax legislation of the 1958 Regular
Session. However, the following comments are directed only to those enactments of more general concem. 1
LEGISLATION

A. Income Tax
The 1958 amendment undoubtedly affecting the greatest number of taxpayers is that which eliminates the election to pay the income tax in installments.2 Probably most Virginians are now well aware that begin45. If, for example, two counties desire to establish a recreation area according to the
example given in the text, may they proceed under the cooperation act rather than the
Park Authorities Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-714.1 -714.11 (Repl. Vol. 1956), and so
create their own legal entity? Presumably, such an entity could not issue bonds. But
what contractual authority may it have? May it sue and be sued? If it is subject to suit,
would an entity created jointly by a city and county share the county's immunity in a
personal injury action, or would it be liable as a city, or would a direct action lie against
the city as a joint tortfeasor?
46. See VA. CoDE ANN. § 5-24 (Repl. Vol. 1956), § 5-24.1 (Supp. 1958) (joint airport
operation).
• Professor of Law, William and Mary. Member, Virginia and New York bars. B.S.,
1934, LL.B., 1937, LL.M., 1948, New York University.
I. No attempt is made here to treat revisions and innovations of relatively limited
interest, such as license, public service, and motor fuel tax amendments.
2. VA. CoDE ANN. § 58-117 (Supp. 1958).
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ning with the 1958 income tax, due in 1959, a penalty will be incurred
unless the entire tax is paid on or before the due date of the return. 3
Second in scope, perhaps, is the amendment excluding from gross income
interest on obligations of a political subdivision of the state.4 Formerly,
the interest exclusion was applicable only to federal and Virginia obligations.
The amended provision now conforms to the federal income tax exclusion
which also exempts obligations of state political subdivisions.
Other income tax enactments of significance permit public school teachers
to deduct expenses incurred for summer college work to improve their
professional qualifications or standing,5 and deny deductibility of contributions to persons supporting litigation in which they have no direct interest.6
The summer school expense deduction authority apparently goes further
than the much publicized Hill v. Conmzissioner, 7 where the Fourth Circuit
upheld a federal tax deduction for such expenses incurred to maintain
current status.

B. Corporate Entrance Fee
Code section 58-448, providing that a foreign corporation had no right
to transact business in Virginia until it had paid its entrance fee and had
been issued a certificate, was repealed. 8 Repeal does not, of course, eliminate
the tax or affect the procedure for its collection, but it may possibly be
construed to eliminate the payment of the tax as a condition precedent to
conducting operations of any character within the state.
C. Tangible Personal Property Tax

In tax years beginning after 1958, household goods and personal effects incidental to maintaining an abode may be exempted by the local governing
body.9 With the exception of automobiles, business equipment, and property
held solely for investment, the tangible personal property tax thus becomes
wholly optional with the local governing body.
3. The penalty is five per cent of the unpaid ta.x unless it was assessed by the Commissioner upon a return illed in good faith and without fault. This is in addition to interest of one-half of one per cent monthly, irrespective of good faith and no fault.
4. VA. CoDE ANN. § 58'-78(b) (5) (Supp. 1958).
5. VA. CoDE ANN.§ 58-81(r) (Supp.1958).
6. VA. CoDE ANN. § 58-84.1 (Supp. 1958).
7. 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
8. Va. Acts 1958, c. 562.
9. VA. CoDE ANN. § 58-829.1 (Supp. 1958). In addition to the comprehensive description, "All other tangible personal property used by an individual or a family or household incident to maintaining an abode," the section enumerates seven classes of items,
including luxuries, which might adorn the home or the person.
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D. Erroneous Assessments
Pursuant to section 58-1141, application may be made to the local commissioner of revenue for correction of an erroneous assessment of local license
ta."es and local levies on tangible personalty, merchants' capital, and (if it
was the commissioner's error) realty, within five years following the year
of assessment. While this section remains substantially unchanged, a new
provision has been inserted into section 58-1142 limiting the refunds of a
paid tax to a period of two years following the year of assessment, or to three
years "since" the assessment if, under new section 58-1152.1, the local governing body has provided by ordinance for refund procedure. These periods
apply only to refunds and not to exoneration from unpaid erroneous assessments, and apparently have no application where, under section 58-1145,
within one year following the assessment year relief is sought in the courts
rather than with the local commissioner.
JumciAL

DECISIONs

A. Privilege Tax on Business of Selling
Virginia ceded exclusive jurisdiction of the Washington National Airport
to the United States, reserving the right to levy a ta." on the sale of motor
fuels for use in over-the-road vehicles.10 The state retail merchants license
tax,11 and Arlington County's business privilege license ta.,., 12 both measured
by the amount of sales, were assessed against a seller of oil and gasoline at
the airport as being within the reservation, in addition to the state tax of
six cents per gallon on all gasoline sold for motor vehicle use. Conceding
that the six cents per gallon tax was proper, the seller sought relief from
the license taxes. Holding in Floyd v. Fischer13 that the business privilege
tax and retail merchants tax were not taxes on the sale of motor fuels, even
though measured thereby, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the
circuit court, which had dismissed the petition, and granted relief. The
Court, speaking through Justice Whittle, said the intention to reserve the
right to assess privilege taxes, which it termed regulatory measures, was not
spelled out in plain language, and that substantial doubts whether tax legislation includes within its scope certain subject matter must be resolved in
favor of the ta."Payer.
The Court did not specifically refer to the distinction between the subject and measure of a ta.,., so frequently made since Flint v. Stone Tracy CoY•
10. VA. CODE ANN.§ 7-9 (1950).
11. VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 58-320 to -335 (1950).
12. Arlington County Business Privilege Ta.-,: Ordinance, art. 67.
13. 199 Va. 363, 99 S.E.2d 612 (1957).
14. 220 U.S. 107 (1911). In this case, the 1909 federal ta.\: on corporations, measured by
net income, was held not to be a then forbidden income taX.
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This distinction has more often served to sustain a tax, which would otherwise have been invalid if held to be upon the subject of commerce itself,
rather than upon commerce as only the measure of the amount of tax liability.
However, these propositions have by no means only a one-way application
for the convenience of the taxing jurisdiction. The distinction between
subject and measure clearly underlies the result reached here, and its application to invalidate an indirect tax, which would have been sustained
had it been imposed directly, has some support.l5
B. Apportioned Gross Receipts of Interstate Business

Virginia now levies a "franchise" tax upon express companies doing
business in the state, measured by the gross receipts derived from the
transportation within the state of express transported through, into, or
out of the state.16 The former statutory provisions imposing this tax termed
it an annual license tax for the privilege of doing business in the state, stating
that it was in addition to the usual property taxes. In 1953 the Supreme
Court of Appeals sustained the constitutionality of the old tax as applied
to the Railway Express Agency, a Delaware corporation doing only interstate business in Virginia.l7 The Court found that the tax was essentially
an intangible property tax on good will or going concern value, and, therefore, not invalid as a state tax on the privilege of doing interstate business.
However, five members of the United States Supreme Court agreed that
the practical effect of the tax conformed more to the statutory description
of a business privilege tax than to the Virginia Court's classification, and
held the tax invalid.lS Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, indulged in some mathematics to find that as an intangible property tax,
using the prescribed Virginia rate of 50 cents per $100, the intangible
assemblage value of the Railway Express' tangible property exceeded more
than 100 times its cost. This might not overtax the express company, but
did overtax the Court's credulity.19 Mr. Justice Clark, joined by Justices
Black, Douglas, and Chief Justice Warren, were prepared to accept the
Virginia Court's classification.
15. See McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944) (sales tax measured by
selling price invalid although use tax using same measure would have been proper).
16. VA. ConE ANN. § 58-547 (Supp. 1958).
17. Railway &'Press Agency, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 757, 75 S.E.2d 61 (1953).
18. 347 u.s. 359 (1954).
19. Apparently Mr. Justice Jackson's mathematics were directed at examining the relation between the subject and measure of the ta.x. The lack of such relation has sometimes proved fatal to a state tax on a separable local aspect of an interstate activity,
where the measure used was found to reach more than was fairly allocable to the local
incident. See Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951); McCarroll v.
Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176 (1940).
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In 1956 the Virginia legislature revised the Code sections taxing express
companies so as to term the tax a franchise ta.....:, removing the unpalatable
(as applied to wholly interstate business) language "for the privilege of
doing business," and providing specifically that the ta....: was in lieu of other
taxes on intangibles and rolling stock.20 The 1956 tax assessment against
Railway Express was upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeals in Railway
Express Agency, Inc. v. CommonwealthP the Court once more finding
that the tax was on the separate and otherwise untaxed value of the property's
assemblage as a going business. The language impediment to validity
seemingly well overcome, the mathematics may take on less significance.22
C. Assessment of Unique Property

The problem of evaluating properties which are adaptable only for special
uses is a most difficult one for assessors, particularly where, as in Virginia,
the criterion of "fair market value" is set forth by the constitution. 23 Unique
properties rarely have a determinable market, and ascertaining how much
the property would sell for under normal selling conditions is largely guesswork, more or less depending upon the size of the class of potential buyers
who could make use of it. In Tuckahoe Woman's Club v. City of Richmond24
the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed a lower court order and set aside
an assessment of $105,000 based upon depreciated reproduction cost, as
excessive in relation to the property's fair market value. The property was
subject to a restrictive covenant that it could be used only as a woman's
club, and furthermore, its rooms were suitable only for club use. Taking
the view that there was no general market for such property, the assessor
had considered the depreciated reproduction cost as the best evidence of
the value of the property to the present owners. Justice Buchanan's opinion
acknowledged that depreciated reproduction cost is a factor which may
well be considered, but only as it might affect the market value, and not
as the sole measure for ascertaining value to a particular owner.
Perhaps underlying this result was a finding that the property was not
so unique that it did not have a market, and therefore, the price for which
it would be likely to sell, as agreed by all the witnesses, 25 was conclusive
20. VA. CooE ANN. §§ 58-546, -547 (Supp. 1958).
21. 199 Va. 589, 100 S.E.2d 785 (1957).
22. The United States Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction, 356 U.S. 929
(1958). Of the five forming the majority in the 1954 decision, Justices Reed, Jackson, and
Minton have left the Court.
23. VA. CoNsr. art. XIU, § 169.
24. 199 Va. 734, 101 S.E.2d 571 (1958).
25. An expert for the taxpayer-plaintiff admitted that there was no fair market value
for clubs, lodges, churches, or things of that nature, that they do not enjoy a market like
other types of property, and that when asked for their fair market value, " 'you more or
less pull it out of the air.' " !d. at 736, 101 S.E.2d at 572.
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of the assessed valuation. It would certainly be more comforting, at least
to the taxing authorities, to regard the result in that light rather than to
suppose that the Court would so favor the test of what others might pay
for property, regardless of its marketability, as to uphold a contention
whereby a taxpayer would pay less tax on property with a building on it
than if the land were unimproved.2s
D. Dissolved Corporation Resurrected
The Federal Housing Administration had insured mortgages of the
mortgagor Virginia corporations. Subsequently it acquired title to the
mortgaged properties upon surrender by the mortgagors to the mortgagee,
and in tum, by the mortgagee to FHA. The mortgagor corporations were
then dissolved, distributing their assets in liquidation to their two nonresident stockholders, and certificates of dissolution were issued by the
State Corporation Commission. Twelve years later, the FHA realized an
excess of $255,000 from the management or sale of the properties. Pursuant
to the National Housing Act, prior to its 1948 amendment, such excess was
required to be paid to the mortgagors. 27 In 1956 a receiver was appointed
for the mortgagor corporations and the $255,000 was paid to him. Upon
the State Tax Commissioner's assessment of income taxes arising out of
the $255,000, the receiver filed a petition alleging that the taxes were
erroneously assessed because the Commissioner was without authority to
assess corporations which had dissolved and distributed their assets twelve
years earlier.
In Ashburn v. Commonwealth 28 the Supreme Court of Appeals, affirming
the dismissal of the petition by the lower court, found that the corporations
were resurrected under the provisions of former Code section 13-73, and
that Code section 58-128 gives the Tax Commissioner authority to impose
the income tax upon every domestic corporation, whether dissolved, continuing, or resurrected. 29 While title 13 of the Code was repealed and replaced by title 13.1, effective January 1, 1957, the same result might con26. Cf. People ex rel. New York Stock Exch. Bldg. Co. v. Cantor, 221 App. Div. 193,
223 N.Y. Supp. 64 (1st Dep't 1927), aff'd mem., 24'8 N.Y. 533, 162 N.E. 514 (1928). In
this case, the New York Stock E.'l:change unsuccessfully contended that its Wall Street
building, costing more than $4,000,000 to reproduce, should escape taxation because no
one else could make any use of the building whatsoever.
27. 52 Stat. 19 (1938).
28. 199 Va. 747, 102 S.E.2d 28'1 (1958).
29. No reference is made in the decision on this point to § 58-129, which deals specifically with the assessment and collection of income taxes of dissolved corporations, perhaps
because it was thought irrelevant in view of the "resurrection"; also, the term "such
taxable year" used in the section may be construed to apply only to the taxable year of
dissolution.
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ceivably be reached today by coupling with section 58-128 present section
13.1-94(f), which gives any court with general equity jurisdiction full
power to liquidate the remaining assets and business of a dissolved corporation upon application of any person for good cause.30

30. Section 13.1-101, survival of remedy after dissolution, would seem to be confined
to liabilities incurred prior to dissolution, and of course the tax liability here in issue
does not arise until the receipt of the funds, twelve years thereafter.

